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We use a confirmatory factor analysis to study the relation between 
the importance of a broad spectrum of saving motives, such as saving for 
retirement, and saving behavior. Survey data show that many respondents 
save  for  retirement  in  unconventional  retirement  accounts,  such  as 
investments in real estate. We show that finding the retirement motive 
important does not directly translate in additional retirement savings. We 
show  that  the  annuity  stream  generated  by  conventional  and 
unconventional  accounts  from  age  65  onwards  is  small  and  that  most 
savings are residual and are not being put aside for a specific motive. Also 
self-employed  retirement  savings  are  low,  even  though  this  group  has 
generally no occupational pension. 
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The identification of the empirical relevance of saving motives has created several 
problems to applied researchers in recent years. While there is theoretical consensus that 
a broad formulation of the intertemporal allocation problem allows the identification of 
three  motives  to  save  (Gourinchas  and  Parker  2001),  it  is  far  from  clear  what  the 2 
 
empirical relevance is of these motives. It is very difficult to quantify the amount of 
savings that households are putting aside for retirement purposes specifically (such as 
retiring early or supplementing future pension benefits), as this type of saving is not in 
theory separable from other types.  
Studies  on  non-compulsory  retirement  savings  typically  explore  the  traditional 
products in the household portfolio, such as annuities and life insurances (Brown et al 
2007), but neglect the existence of unconventional retirement accounts. “A house or a 
pension?” titled The Independent a few years ago, claiming that you could get two for 
the price of one. We will also show that many home owners regard their home as a 
pension saving. This is what we mean by unconventional retirement savings: that part 
of wealth put aside to finance consumption after retirement, which is not held in a 
traditional retirement account, but invested in real estate or any other saving account.  
Life-cycle savings, precautionary savings and bequests, are the motives that can be 
identified.  However  those  who  have  attempted  estimating  these  models  on  empirical 
data have been rewarded with results that are far apart from each other (Kennickell and 
Lusardi 2004). Recent research by Lusardi (1997) and Mastrogiacomo et al. (2010) tries 
to  reconcile  the  empirical  literature  that  estimates  precautionary  savings  as  being 
marginal (Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992)) or very relevant (Carroll and Samwick 
(1998)).  These  studies  show  how  results  may  differ  depending  on  the  dataset  being 
studied, the population that is being considered, the method applied and the country 
that is being investigated. However these studies cannot be more precise concerning the 
underlying mechanism driving for instance the precautionary saving decisions, nor the 
decisions  to  save  for  other  motives,  such  as  retirement.  Do  for  instance  ‘life-cycle 
savings’ identify savings for the future purchase of a durable good, or are they meant to 
finance consumption after retirement? The answer to this kind of questions is a purely 
empirical  matter,  which  is  complicated  if  we  also  take  unconventional  retirement 
accounts  into  account.  Theory  does  not  allow  being  more  precise  on  this  issue  and 
imposes stringent assumptions to even identify the bequest motive (Gan, Gong, Hurd, 
and McFadden 2004). 
While  this  discussion  is  interesting  in  the  framework  of  the  life-cycle  model 
(Browning and Lusardi 1996), psychologists have also looked at this issue. There is an 3 
 
interesting literature on the concept of savings itself (Groenland, Bloem, and Kuijlen 
1996).  Saving  motives  have  been  analyzed  in  their  hierarchical  structure  (Canova, 
Rattazzi, and Webley 2005), the effectiveness of the implementation (Rabinovich and 
Webley 2007) and their relation to observable characteristics (Erskine, Kier, Leung, and 
Sproule 2006). Our study is related to this literature, we aim at gauging the relation 
among saving motives. We further extend the study and try to understand whether 
those who find the different saving motives more important also save more. 
Kennickell  and  Lusardi  (2004)  propose  an  approach  which  rests  in  between  the 
economic and the psychological one, as they use micro data on individual beliefs, in 
order to identify the relevance of saving motives in determining saving behavior. We 
follow their path, though with a different approach. We look at the relative importance 
of different saving motives as a determinant of the variation in household savings. 
We ask ourselves two questions. First: how does information about the importance 
of several saving motives at a low hierarchical level (the saving motive, e.g. saving due 
to  supplement  social  security  benefit)  relate  to  the  saving  factors  that  can  be 
theoretically isolated (e.g. lifecycle/retirement savings)? Second: once these motives are 
combined with each other in a saving factor, which is the most relevant and how much 
wealth  accumulation  do  they  explain  in  unconventional  retirement  accounts?  Notice 
that without such an approach it is not possible to identify the share of retirement 
savings in unconventional accounts. 
The reason we ask these question is that in many western countries (among which 
the  Netherlands,  which  we  deal  with  in  this  study)  more  and  more  individual 
responsibility is needed in saving for retirement (and eventually in the future the health 
care system). A tendency to falling retirement replacement rates due to pension reforms 
(van Duijn et al 2009) requests individuals to save more in order to maintain the living 
standards that the old systems had granted. But are future retirees doing that?   
Horioka and Watanabe (1997), analyze detailed data on saving targets. They show 
that their saving motives follow the expected life-cycle pattern but are puzzled by the 
high saving of the elderly for retirement purposes. They compute average saving and 
dissaving for each motive and find that Japanese respondents accumulate 14% of their 
savings for no specific reasons, but mostly save for retirement, housing (largely financed 4 
 
by  loan  repayment)  illness,  education  and  marriage,  while  the  bequest  motive  is 
negligible. We have found a study also for the Netherlands. Bernoth and van Rooij 
(2005) observe a direct relation between the size of the household and bequest motives 
in the Netherlands. By pooling 13 different savings motives they observe that saving for 
retirement has become less important over time than saving for purchase of durables in 
the  future.  This  is  partly  motivated  by  the  fact  that  the  vast  majority  of  the 
respondents  believes  that  compulsory  savings  do  not  need  to  be  supplemented  to 
safeguard income at later ages. Nevertheless most also believe that in the mid-run social 
security  facilities  will  become  less  attractive.  In  short,  when  looking  at  a  detailed 
number of saving motives it seems that in order to say something sensible in terms of 
retirement savings, we cannot abstract from all other motives to save.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature because it provides a description of 
free  retirement  savings  for  the  Netherlands,  detained  both  in  conventional  and 
unconventional retirement accounts.  We also show that these savings are so limited 
that  policy  makers  cannot  assume  that  the  progressive  reduction  in  retirement 
replacement rates will be compensated by personal retirement savings. Beside the use of 
unconventional  accounts  for  retirement  motives  suggest  the  most  profitable  saving 
choices are not being taken. Finally we show also statistics that suggest a low take up of 
fiscally facilitated pension savings in two target groups, the income-poor and the self-
employed.  
The study is organized as follows. The next section describes retirement savings in 
our data. Section 3 combines the answer to 12 different savings motives in a reduced 
number of factors that can be loosely related to theory. Section 4 shows results of a 
model explaining ‘active’ savings (where passive returns on equities are subtracted) on 
the base of these factors. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 Data and descriptive analysis 
 
In this study we use the DNB household survey (DHS). The DHS is administered by 
CentERdata, which is associated with Tilburg University, the Netherlands. This is a 5 
 
unique example of a long panel where both data on savings and saving motives are 
registered. To our knowledge no other data set is able to provide this information.  
The survey is sponsored by De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), the Dutch central bank. 
The aim of the DHS is, among others, to furnish information on both economical and 
psychological determinants of savings. The survey is conducted annually with questions 
being posted over several weeks, starting 1993/1994. In this study, we use the waves up 
to  and  including  2008.  Each  year,  the  survey  contains  approximately  1000-1500 
households (well over 2500 individuals) and is an unbalanced panel. 
The information used in the present study comes from different parts of the survey, 
and therefore the sample dimension varies. In this section we describe the accounts in 
which  respondents  keep  their  targeted  retirement  and  also  how  important  they  find 
saving for retirement. 
 
2.1 Observed retirement savings 
 
The best way to investigate the empirical relevance of free retirement savings is by 
documenting  the  amount  of  savings  that  are  held  in  retirement  accounts.  These 
accounts  can  be  of  different  kind,  depending  on  the  portfolio  choices  and  individual 
circumstances of the respondents. 
The data has little item non response when it comes to the ownership rates of these 
accounts. We will now describe both the ownership rates and median values of these 
accounts. 
In  Table  1,  we  show  summary  statistics  on  retirement  savings  on  a  number  of 
dimensions.  Column  A  reports  the  ownership  rates  of  several  types  of  employer-
sponsored accounts. For most of the sample period this category is dominated by the 
‘save-as-you-earn  deduction  arrangement’  (in  Dutch  “spaarloon”).    This  employer-
sponsored savings plan allows employees to deposit a certain amount (about 600 euro 
per year in 2010, but the amount was higher in the 1990’s) of the gross salary onto a 
separate  saving  account.  Under  certain  conditions,  the  saved  sum  is  not  subject  to 
income tax and no premiums for social insurance policies have to be paid on it. Also, no 
money  may  be  withdrawn  from  this  particular  savings  account  for  a  period  of  four 6 
 
years. There are a number of exceptions to this rule. The money saved through the 
save-as-you-earn  deduction  arrangement  may  for  example  be  used  to  pay  for  the 
premiums for an annuity or for other life-insurance policies. Also, if no such options are 
chosen, it is still worth keeping this money in the separate account until retirement, in 
order  to  avoid  wealth  taxes.  The  table  shows  that  the  arrangement  was  relatively 
popular since the introduction (it was first reported in 1995). These accounts contain 
small amounts (about 2000 euro in 2006 prices) and are not very often cashed out. 
When they are, about 25% transfers it to a pension annuity, while about 6% transfers it 
to a single premium annuity (that pays as a lump sum).   
  Column C reports the ownership rates of private pension annuities. These differ 
depending on the periodicity of the payments of the premium, but all pay out 
periodically (for example, annually) from a certain date until the time of death of the 
insured. These are, therefore, the closest to a third pillar pension. Column E reports the 
ownership rate (about 15%) of endowment life insurance policies. Contrary to the 
standard annuity, these products pay out in a lump sum, and so far people have 
accumulated about 8000 euro in these accounts. The median value of annuities each 
year is about 25000 euro and of endowment policies about 8000 euro. The average age of 
the owner of such products is 55 years. Column H shows that the premiums being paid 
each year total about 1000 euro in the past five years. This means that if premiums 
continue to be paid as described above, the median value of annuities for annuity 
owners at age 65 (old age pension entitlement age in the Netherlands) will hardly reach 
30000 euro.7 
 
 Table 1. Free pension savings different accounts, ownership rates and destinations. 
 
A  B  A1  A2  A3  A4  NA  C  D  NC  E  F  NE  H 
1994  21%  1334 
       
1656  15%  38832  1656  11%  4447  1656  5000 
1995  43%  1105 
       
1491  18%  32818  1491  10%  4360  1491  3500 
1996  51%  1822 
       
1272  21%  32403  1272  13%  4270  1272  3265 
1997  47%  2702  1%  1%  19%  4%  935  23%  31360  907  15%  6920  907  3000 
1998  45%  3040  1%  3%  28%  4%  508  24%  27683  504  14%  7599  504  2400 
1999  51%  3400  3%  2%  24%  7%  537  24%  26559  536  15%  5312  536  2640 
2000  44% 
         
446  27%  16808  335  15%  7787  335  2160 
2001  48%  2990  3%  0%  25%  5%  810  30%  35021  618  16%  6479  618  2000 
2002  52%  3327  2%  2%  28%  8%  802  33%  19302  654  19%  7962  654  1854 
2003  47%  3546  3%  1%  33%  5%  838  30%  20519  753  18%  8273  753  1560 
2004  37%  2251  1%  1%  29%  6%  868  29%  14002  635  15%  12345  635  1200 
2005  49%  2343  1%  1%  26%  7%  790  31%  20601  709  17%  9646  709  1069 
2006  42%  1931  1%  0%  23%  7%  737  30%  18000  676  15%  11000  676  1020 
2007  40%  2067  1%  1%  21%  7%  754  31%  18601  710  15%  10501  710  1080 
2008  39%  2355  2%  1%  24%  5%  686  32%  19205  628  15%  13425  628  1080 
2009  39%  2327  2%  1%  20%  5%  630  30%  20983  596  18%  9603  596  948 
sum  
           
13760 
   
12680 
   
12680 
  mean  43%  2436  2%  1%  25%  6%     27%  24543     15%  8121     2189 
Explanatory note: A = ownership rate of employer-sponsored accounts, B = median value of employer-sponsored account, A1 = 
share of employer-sponsored accounts owners that cashed out in order to buy a house, A2 = share of employer-sponsored accounts 
owners that cashed out in order to buy stocks, A3 = share of employer-sponsored accounts owners that cashed out in order to buy 
an annuity insurance (pension insurance), A4 = share of employer-sponsored accounts owners that cashed out in order to buy a 
single premium annuity, C = ownership rate of  single-premium insurance and/or annuity insurance (pension insurance), D = 
median (minimum guaranteed) value of single-premium insurance and/or annuity insurance (pension insurance) at reported year, E 
= ownership rate of endowment life insurance policy, F = median of all premiums paid into an endowment life insurance policy to 
reported year, H = median yearly private annuity premium. N = sample size. Weighted statistics. Median values are expressed in 
2006 prices. All medians are conditional on ownership. Last row reports the average of the ownership rates and medians.  8 
 
              
Table 1b : Pension savings of selected groups 
 











lower 20%  19.5%  11.0%  30622  7641 
upper 20%  39.8%  22.4%  43830  9036 
self employed  32%  16%  50110  9375 
non self employed  26%  16%  25986  7691 
 
In Table 1b we compare 4 groups, namely the poor (lower 20% income distribution) 
to the rich (upper 20%) and the self-employed
1 to the non-self-employed.  
The table provides two interesting insides. First, the ownership of fiscally facilitated 
savings is more common among the rich than the poor. The rich also save more in these 
accounts. Those interested in distributional issues will find this evidence relevant, as it 
suggests bottom-up redistribution. The second interesting finding is that  being a self-
employed does not explain differences in ownership of fiscally facilitated pension savings. 
When self-employed own these accounts, they save significantly more.  
It is past the scope of this paper to discuss optimal fiscal design. Our evidence 
suggests that the group s (self-employed and the income poor) ,  who motivated the 
introduction of the fiscal facilitation, profit the least of this regulation. Further research 
is needed to address this issue more in detail. 
 
Table 2  reports the median values, conditional on ownership, of the following 
product: 
, (65 )
, , , ,
11
it age
i t i t i t i t
i
ANN D F H
i
                              (1) 
where D is the minimum guaranteed value of single premium insurance and/or annuity 
insurance (pension insurance) in the reported year, F is the sum of all premiums paid 
into an endowment life insurance policy until the reported year, H is the yearly private 
annuity premium, D and F are stocks and H is a flow. In the computation, we assume 
                                                           
1 Self employed are identified in different ways in the survey. We use question IZ1: “Were you  also self-
employed, or free profession/free lance in 2005? Being the director of a public/private limited company is 
employment on a contractual basis”, which is available for all waves. 9 
 
i=5%, which we make on purpose very generous. The ownership rates in Table 2 are 
lower than are those in Table 1, where the products D, F and H are taken separately. 
As ANN is a combination of these products, the median value is also in between those 
reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 2: Present value of annuities at age 65 for whole sample 
 
ownership   median  monthly   mean  N 
 
rate  value  payment  value 
     ANN   ANN  starting at 65  ANN    
1994  14%  24850  133  63845  2447 
1995  15%  21835  117  61716  2217 
1996  16%  23809  128  60409  1980 
1997  15%  30448  171  62164  1646 
1998  13%  23620  127  48368  1269 
1999  16%  19375  104  44929  1102 
2000  14%  25386  142  41960  936 
2001  17%  25418  143  44695  1348 
2002  20%  23410  126  57522  1380 
2003  21%  16558  89  43537  1409 
2004  17%  16483  89  30973  1304 
2005  23%  16186  87  45449  1347 
2006  23%  15560  84  36952  1288 
2007  23%  15293  83  35259  1166 
2008  23%  16291  87  43021  1044 
2009  25%  14234  76  30510  963 
mean  18%  20547  112  46957    
Explanatory  note:  Weighted  statistics.  Median  and  mean  values  are 
conditional on ownership. The monthly payment of the annuity starting 
at age 65 is computed using an annuity calculator inputting the median 
value of ANN. The present value is computed at prices 2006.  
 
Our computations
2 indicate that such median values at current market conditions 
could provide an annuity flow of about 112 euro per month, starting at age 65. This is 
about 10% of the current old age pension benefit, which is about half of the retirement 
benefit to a median employee. 
                                                           
2 See, for instance, the annuity calculator at http://www.find.co.uk/pensions/annuities_centre/annuities-
calculator. 10 
 
The means, conditional on ownership, of ANN are also reported. These are much 
higher than are the medians, as the distribution of financial wealth is skewed. Both the 
median and the mean decrease over time.  This  might be because of the increase in 
ownership rates, mostly among households who save small amounts. 
In more recent waves, the DHS data have started to include information about free 
pension arrangements. Since 2004, the following question has been asked: “Have you 
made other arrangements for your pension apart from the customary pension you build 
up through your employer?”. In line with the results in Table 1, the upper panel of 
Table 3 also shows that pension annuities are the most popular category of additional 
arrangements.  The  middle  panel  of  the  table  is  particularly  interesting.  There,  we 
analyzed  the  open-ended  answers  of  those  who  replied  “other  arrangements”  to 
preceding questions. 
We  take  these  results  on  “other  arrangements”  as  inspiration  for  subsequent 
analysis on the whole sample, though here only a subgroup reports this information. 
The  implicit  assumption  is  that  if  the  whole  sample  was  asked  about  other 
arrangements along the standard ones, they would also report any of the following
3.  
                                                           
3 This assumption is relatively innocent as we are going to show a very limited role of unconventional 
accounts even when we assume that those are relevant to all.  11 
 
Table 3: Additional questions on savings for retirement preparation and life course scheme 
 
2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Preparation (per household): 
            annuities    23.3%  23.7%  19.9%  21.2%  22.3%  19.0% 
whole life policies   7.5%  8.6%  7.5%  8.7%  9.2%  7.3% 
buying extra pension rights via employer  2.0%  1.9%  1.7%  1.3%  2.3%  1.6% 
extra periodical payments via employer   1.3%  1.3%  1.2%  1.5%  0.8%  0.4% 
other arrangements  5.8%  7.3%  5.5%  8.4%  8.4%  7.8% 
Size sample 1  1060  993  958  963  931  873 
Other arrangements (individual level) 
            Any form of real estate  14.8%  15.5%  17.0%  19.4%  12.3%  14.2% 
Any form of free savings  81.5%  74.1%  70.2%  72.6%  77.4%  76.4% 
Other mandatory savings (e.g. partner pension)  20.4%  16.4%  23.4%  21.0%  17.0%  19.8% 
Does not report any of the previous  1.9%  4.3%  7.4%  6.5%  5.7%  6.6% 
Size sample 2  108  116  94  124  106  106 
Life course scheme (per household): 
            ownership rate 
     
4.2%  4.4%  4.4% 
take up due to retirement motives  
     
49.8%  48.0%  55.9% 
take up due to family related sabbatical 
     
16.6%  12.3%  4.5% 
take up due to other reasons  
     
27.1%  30.9%  33.9% 
take up due to precautionary reasons (rainy days) 
     
6.5%  1.7%  5.7% 
median amount saved in life course scheme 
account 
     
861  1680  3084 
Size sample 3           955  924  870 
Explanatory note: Upper panel reports answer to the question "Have you made other arrangements for your pension apart 
from the customary pension you build up through your employer?". The answer is positive if at least one person in the 
household reports having made the arrangement. The middle  panel reports  the authors’’  classification  of the open-ended 
answers to the question "What other arrangements?" that was asked to those selecting "other arrangements". Here we have 
allowed multiple answers; we take here the individual as a unit and not the household (therefore larger sample size). In the 
lower panel we show results for the question "Did you put part of your salary into a Life Course Savings account last year?" 
and  an  authors’  classification  of  the  answer  to  the  question  "For  what  purpose  did  you  use  your  Life  Sourse  Savings 
Scheme?".   12 
 
In order to classify the answers, we used a search algorithm that identifies part of 
the  string  that  is  being  answered.  Reporting  terms  such  as  “savings”,  “stocks”, 
“insurances”,  “money  aside”  and  similar  are  grouped  in  the  raw  ‘Any  form  of  free 
savings’ in Table 3. Reporting terms such as “real estate”, “apartment”, “house” and 
similar  are  grouped  in  the  raw  ‘Any  form  of  real  estate’.  We  also  grouped  those 
reporting  terms  that  have  some  sort  of  additional  compulsory  savings,  for  instance 
inherited  from  their  partner,  from  a  secondary  job  in  another  country  or  similar 
circumstances. We also allowed for multiple options, as respondents may report any of 
the above at the same time. Table 3 shows that our search algorithm spotted about 95% 
of all respondents and a quick inspection of those who were not allocated to any of the 
abovementioned categories either refused to answer or reported that they did not know. 
Clearly, the largest shares of pension savings that are not captured by the financial 
products listed so far are free savings and, to a lesser degree, real estate saving. This 
means  that  many  respondents  are  preparing  for  their  retirement  without  purchasing 
products that are specifically dedicated to this purpose. 
The lower panel of Table 3 reports the ownership rates, destinations and median 
values of the life course savings scheme. This relatively recent saving scheme, which was 
introduced in January 2006, allows individuals to save up to 12% of their gross incomes 
in  a  dedicated  account  (therefore  tax-free)  in  order  to  invest  the  money  saved  in  a 
sabbatical.  This  period  of  vacation  can  also  be  moved  prior  to  retirement,  thereby 
allowing early retirement. The maximum amount that can be saved is about twice the 
saver’s yearly salary. The difference to other employer-sponsored accounts is that the 
life course savings scheme cannot be cashed out. The table shows that this arrangement 
is not popular yet. Those who have used it did so mostly in order to retire earlier. The 
median value of the accounts is growing fast; however, these balances cannot be used to 
support future retirement income. 
To sum up, in this section we have seen that third pillar savings are only owned by 
one-third  of  the  Dutch  population.  These  savings  are  low  in  the  sense  that  they 
translate into an annuity that is small relative to the future pension benefit. However, 
the information in the data also suggests that many respondents are saving for their 13 
 
pensions  in  unconventional  ways,  such  as  other  saving  accounts  and  real  estate 
investments. 
We  will  now  look  into  these  unconventional  retirement  accounts,  but  first  we 
investigate the retirement saving factor. We will then relate this factor to these more 
general  concepts  of  wealth  accumulation  that  are  not  directly  meant  (but  evidently 
used) for retirement. 
 
2.2 Importance of saving motives 
We have seen that many respondents accumulate savings to support their retirements 
outside traditional retirement savings accounts. 
This  suggests  that  we  should  pool  all  savings  together  (excluding  conventional 
retirement  savings).  We  can  then  try  to  elicit  the  impact  of  retirement  saving  by 
relating  these  pooled  measures  of  savings  to  the  relevance  of  the  retirement  saving 
motive.  As  explained  in  the  introduction,  we  have  data  on  the  importance  of  the 
retirement motive and other motives. These are contained in several different questions 
that allow the construction of a retirement saving factor as well as other saving factors. 
Below, we will discuss the construction of these saving factors, which are based on 
the answers to 12 questions related to saving motives. These factors are thus the higher 
hierarchical step, while the motives are the lower. During the sample period, questions 
on  the  perceived  relevance  of  saving  motives  changed.  Until  2004,  13  motives  were 
questioned. From 2004, the questionnaire has included 16 questions. However, not all 
the old motives were questioned consistently. Only 12 motives have been consistently 
questioned over time using a scale from 1 (very unimportant) to 7 (very important) for 
each saving motive: 
“Is it to you personally of much or of little importance ...” 
1. ... to have some savings to cover unforeseen expenses due to illness or accidents 
2. ... to have some savings in case I or a member of my family get(s) unemployed 
3. ... as a reserve to cover unforeseen expenses 
4. ... to leave money to my children (or other relatives) 
5. ... to give presents or other gifts to my (grand)children 
6. ... to pay for my children’s (or other relatives’) education 14 
 
7. ... to buy durable goods such as furniture, electric appliances, in the future 
8. ... to generate income from interests or dividends 
9. ... to set up my own business 
10. ... to supplement retirement pension, some extra money for when I am retired 
11. ... to buy a house in the future 
12. ... to supplement the social security benefit. 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show these saving motives by age and cohort. This helps us 
understand  whether  the  answers  to  these  questions  correspond  at  least  to  common 
sense. The importance of precautionary savings  on financial reserves (x3) is high all 
along the life cycle and does not differ among cohorts. This is peculiar. From a life-cycle 
perspective, older cohorts should have more certainty about future income because, for 
instance, they have accumulated more pension rights. We will show that active savings 
differ  by  cohort,  although here  the  importance  of  this  special form  of  precautionary 
motive  does  not  differ.  The  importance  of  saving  for  children’s  educations  (x6) 
diminishes over age. This is plausible because as children age households have less need 
to spend out on additional education. This is also in line with the household life cycle 
(Apps and Rees 2001). 
Saving  for  durables  (x7)  is  on  average  constant  over  the  life-cycle;  however, 
important cohort differences are evident.  Younger people attach more importance to 
this motive at any age, even after retirement. This is in line with the idea that younger 
cohorts more often benefit from productivity growth. Finally, the pension motive (x10) 
slightly increases over age, without showing particular cohort differences. 
  Overall, the importance of saving motives is in line with standard predictions by 
the  life-cycle  model  and,  when  it  differs,  it  recalls  already  known  empirical 




Figure 1: saving motives by age and cohort 
   
   
 
Explanatory note: x1 = importance of savings to cover unforeseen expenses due to illness or accidents, x2 = importance of savings in case 
I or a member of my family get(s) unemployed, x3 = importance of savings as a reserve to cover unforeseen expenses, x4 = importance of 
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x4: leave money to my children  16 
 
Figure 2: saving motives by age and cohort 
   
   
 
Explanatory note: x5 = importance of savings to give presents or other gifts to my (grand)children, x6 = importance of savings to pay for 
my children’s (or other relatives’) education, x7 = importance of savings to buy durable goods such as furniture, electric appliances, in the 
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x8: generate income from interests or dividends 17 
 
   
   
 
Figure 3: saving motives by age and cohort. x9 = importance of savings to set up my own business, x10 = importance of savings to supplement 
retirement pension, some extra money for when I am retired, x11 = importance of savings to buy a house in the future, x12 = importance of 
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x12: supplement the social security benefit 18 
 
Table 4 shows the ranking of all motives for the whole sample and for two age-related 
subgroups. Evidently, the importance of the two precautionary motives (x1 and x3) 
scores  highest,  higher  than  do  the  retirement  motives  (e.g.  x10  and  x12),  life  cycle 
motives (e.g. x11 and x6) and bequest motives (e.g. x4 and x5). However, we are not 
interested  in  the  ranking  itself,  but  in  the  relation  between  these  motives,  and 
specifically the factors we include them into, and saving accumulation. We now move 
onto investigate the former. 











          x3  unforeseen expenses  5.44  5.4  5.6 
x1  expenses due to illness   4.76  4.7  4.9 
x10  supplement retirement pension  4.58  4.6  4.6 
x12  supplement the social security benefit  4.43  4.4  4.6 
x2  unemployed  4.12  4.0  4.3 
x7  buy durable goods   3.68  3.6  3.9 
x5  gifts to my (grand)children  3.24  3.4  3.0 
x6  children’s education  3.18  2.8  3.8 
x9  set up my own business  3.00  2.9  3.1 
x11  buy a house in the future  2.70  2.2  3.4 
x8  income from interests or dividends  2.69  2.6  2.9 
x4  leave money to my children   2.64  2.7  2.6 
          N     18147       
Explanatory  note:  the  ranking  is  based  on  the  whole  sample.  The  table  reports  average 
evaluations. For a full description of the saving motives see Section 2.2 
 
   
2.3 Construction of active savings 
We want to group saving motives into saving factors (see next section) and relate these 
factors  to  active  savings.  We  start  by  defining  active  savings.  The  DHS  provides 
detailed information on household assets and liabilities, which enables us to calculate an 
approximation of active household savings. The survey also has a specific question on 
the amount of money put aside in the past 12 months. The question is formulated as 
follows: ‘About how much money has your household put aside in the past 12 months?’. 
This  question  is  answered  by  a  subsample.  Answers  to  this  question  come  in  seven 19 
 
categories, where the first interval is ‘less than €1,500’ and the last ‘€75,000 or more’. 
We assign to each respondent an amount of active savings equal to the middle point of 
the interval chosen, or to the lower bound if the category chosen is the last. Evidently, 
those who do not save or even dissave are not accounted for in this way. In order to 
solve this problem we combine different variables present in our data. The first is the 
answer  to  the  question  ‘Did  your  household  put  any  money  aside  in  the  past  12 
months?’, which can be answered yes or no. The second is the question ‘How is the 
financial situation of your household at the moment?’, which allows the following five 
answers:  1)  there  are  debts,  2)  need  to  draw  upon  savings,  3)  it  is  just  about 
manageable, 4) some money is saved and 5) a lot of money can be saved. 
  Those who answer that no money was put aside or that they just about manage 
their  financial  situations  are  imputed  as  zero  savings.  Those  who  did  not  put  aside 
money and either are in debt or drawing upon their savings are imputed as a (negative) 
measure of active savings, which we will describe below. Finally, those who answer that 
they did put money aside in the past 12 months, but did not answer the question on 
active savings, are imputed as a (positive) measure of active savings, if they claim that 
some money or a lot of money can be saved. 
The active saving measure used in the imputation is based on the first difference 
of net financial wealth excluding pension savings (the reason for this will be explained in 
the next section) and this isolates passive savings in the form of capital gains (Berben et 
al. 2006). This variable is further used to compute the individual savings rate. This is 
the ratio between active savings (as defined above) and permanent income (see Kapteyn 
et al. 2005 for a definition of this variable), which is also used as a dependent variable 
later on. 
  In Figure 4, we plot the development of the savings rate by age and cohort. The 
figure shows a decrease in savings rates. In the plot, we also isolate five years of the 
birth  cohort  to  show  that,  at  a  given  age,  the  savings  rate  for  younger  cohorts  is 
somewhat  higher.  This  cohort  time  effect  is  less  visible  when  only  looking  at  levels 
(results available from authors on request). This suggests that these cohort differences 
are  (permanent)  income-related.  The  figure  shows  that  on  average  the  variation  in 20 
 
savings levels is small (between 1000 and 5000 euro each year). The higher savings rates 
of the young (about 10–15%) are because of the low permanent incomes of this cohort. 
 
 Figure 4: Saving rate over age and cohort. The saving rate is plotted at the median and outliers due to 




3 From saving motives to factors 
 
Let us now group the information on saving motives (low hierarchical variables) with 
saving factors. As  shown in Table 5, we associate the different questions to specific 
factors. Saving motives are then analyzed in their hierarchical structures (Canova et al. 
2005). Following that approach, we attempt to distinguish between ‘salient goals’ (such 
as precautionary savings in general) and specific motives (health risk and unemployment 
risk, which we observe in the data). This association raises many questions. Take, for 
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factor, it is less obvious that individuals might buy a house in order to finance future 
retirement. Variable x11 could indeed also be associated with the life-cycle saving factor. 
 
Table 5: Classification of survey questions into saving factors 
Variable  Factor 
Survey question (motive):  
Is it to you personally of much or of little importance? 




to have some savings to cover unforeseen expenses as a consequence 





to have some savings in case I or a member of my family get(s) 
unemployed  
x3   Precautionary   as a reserve to cover unforeseen expenses  
x4   Bequest   to leave money to my children (or other relatives)  
x5   Bequest   to give presents or other gifts to my (grand)children  





to buy durable goods such as furniture, electric appliances, or  
bicycles in the future  
x8   Life-cycle   to generate income from interests or dividends  





to supplement my retirement pension, to have some extra money 
 to spend when I am retired  
x11   Pension   to buy a house in the future  
x12   Pension   to supplement my social security benefit 
       
As  stated  in  Section  2,  the  analysis  of  the  open -ended  question  about  retirement 
preparation  suggests  that  many  people  see  their  houses  as  an  investment  for  their 
retirement. In order to deal with this we will do two things. The first is to estimate 
different specifications where we join and disjoin the life-cycle and the pension factor. 
The second is to rely on a more structural empirical strategy. 
  We will jointly estimate all factors imposing one-way relations between motives 
and factors and discuss these relations. A powerful tool to handle this econometrically is 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; Kolenikov 2009). We will factor analyze the data by 
grouping the variables into four factors, namely 1) Precautionary factor (variables x1–
x3), 2) Bequest factor (variables x4–x6), 3) Life cycle factor (variables x7–x9) and 4) 
Pension factor (variables x10–x12). 
  Standard  statistical  packages  offer  the  possibility  of  carrying  out  exploratory 
factor analysis. For CFA, the model structure must be specified in advance: the number 22 
 
of factors must be postulated as well as the relations between those factors and the 
observed variables. To return to the example above, the relation between variable x11 
and the life cycle factor is here explicitly imposed as being equal to 0. While this may 
seem  a  strong  assumption,  it  has  the  clear  advantage  that  all  factor  loadings  are 
estimated conditional on this assumption. Formally: 
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1 12 ,     ,..., ,     , 0 V V diag Cov  
Here  j , j = 1,...,12, are the factor loadings to be estimated,  k= ... (where  = 
4, in this case) are the latent factors and  j are the measurement errors. 
Linear relations are postulated to hold between the factors and observed motives: 
        1
,         1,...,
m
ij j jk ij
k jk
y j p          (3) 
  Relative to exploratory factor analysis, we will evidently not allow for a free form 
of the variance and covariance matrix, but we will assume some zeros at specific cells. 
Table 6 shows the factor loadings and the covariances and correlations of four different 
specifications.  In  the  first,  three  factors  are  elicited  from  the  analysis,  because  the 
pension motive is taken together with the life cycle motive. In the second, we split the 
life cycle into two factors, thereby isolating saving for retirement or pensions. Next, the 
λs  are  grouped  by  latent  variable.  Also,  the  s,  the  covariances,  are  reported.  All 
parameters are freely estimated, with the exception of the loadings that are used for 23 
 
identification. These are set equal to 1 and have no standard errors. This means that 
the  contribution  of  each  motive  to  the  latent  saving  factor  is  compared  with  this 
reference. Take, for instance, retirement savings in the second specification. Motive 12 
(importance of social security) is also close to 1. This means that motive 10 (importance 
of pension) and 12 are similar determinants of the latent factor. This is also revealed in 
the descriptive analyses, where on average these motives are very close across cohorts 
and periods (see Figure 3). At the bottom of the table, we also report some indicators of 
reliability (R2). These express the proportion of the variance of the observed saving 
motives explained by the model. If we had regressed the observed saving motives on 
their latent factors, this could be thought of as the resulting R-squared (R2). 
  One possible issue that arises is that in our CFA model the variables responsible 
for  the  pension  factor,  such  as  social  security  and  pension,  are  closely  related  and, 
therefore, actually measure similar concepts (definitely so for all those who do not have 
a second pillar pension). In addition, the correlation with savings for a house (x11) is 
weaker. In order to tackle this, we estimated a third specification in which x10 and x12 
are allowed to correlate. The results of this last specification are added into the third 
model  in  Table  6.  In  order  to  appreciate  the  difference  in  this  specification  (which 
returns a significant correlation between these two motives), we look at the R2. The 
reported R2 for the motives x10 and x12 decreased, while the one for x11 increased. All 
other results are approximately unchanged. This indicates that the pension factor is 
based on the covariances of the three motives associated with it and, to a lesser extent, 
on the covariances between the past three and the remaining nine observed motives. 
  This is reassuring and shows that our classification is defendable. Although the 
pension factor now contributes less to explaining the covariance between x10 and x12, 
all results are still significant. The last model in the table still accounts for the four 
separate saving factors, but now only on the basis of eight motives. This implies that 
only four loadings are freely estimated (plus the reference loading equal to 1). This last 
specification also confirms that when we remove the correlation between the importance 
of  saving for  a pension  (x10)  and  social  security  (x12) by dropping  the former,  the 
proportion of the variance of x11 explained by the model increases. In the appendix, we 
also report a table with correlations among saving motives. 24 
 
Table 6: Results confirmatory factor analysis 
   3 factors  4 factors  Corr. errors  4 factors 8 motives 
   Coeff  St. err.  Coeff  St. err.  Coeff  St. err.     Coeff  St. err. 




                  λ1,1  1  .  1  .  1  .    
    λ2,1  1.05  0.02  1.08  0.02  1.08  0.02  λ1,1=  1  . 
λ3,1  0.76  0.01  0.80  0.01  0.80  0.01  λ2,1=  0.58  0 
Loadings Bequest 
           
  
    λ4,2  1  .  1  .  1  .  λ3,2=  1  . 
λ5,2  0.895  0.013  0.89  0.01  0.89  0.01  λ4,2=  1.33  0 
λ6,2  0.878  0.014  0.87  0.01  0.88  0.01    
    Loadings Life-cycle 
           
  
    λ7,3  1  .  1  .  1  .  λ5,3=  1  . 
λ8,3  0.47  0.02  0.52  0.02  0.67  0.02  λ6,3=  0.80  0.02 
λ9,3  0.63  0.02  0.91  0.03  0.74  0.02    
    λ10,3  2.10  0.04 
       
  
    λ11,3  0.82  0.02 
       
  
    λ12,3  2.13  0.04 
       
  
    Loadings Pension 
           
  
    λ10,4 
   
1  .  1  .    
    λ11,4 
   
0.34  0.01  0.96  0.02  λ7,4=  1  . 
λ12,4        1.00  0.01  1  0.01  λ8,4=  0.89  0.02 
Cov , jk ,  
   
 
            Precautionary-precautionary  1.19  0.03  1.14  0.03  1.14  0.03 
 
1.82  0.06 
Bequest-bequest   2.10  0.04  2.11  0.04  2.11  0.04 
 
1.40  0.05 
Precautionary-bequest   0.49  0.02  0.48  0.02  0.47  0.02 
 
0.40  0.02 
Life cycle-life cycle   0.57  0.02  0.70  0.03  0.74  0.03 
 
0.74  0.03 
Bequest-life cycle   0.31  0.01  0.53  0.02  0.58  0.02 
 
0.56  0.02 
Precautionary-life cycle   0.61  0.02  0.81  0.02  0.77  0.02 
 
0.58  0.02 
Pension - pension  
   
2.63  0.04  0.83  0.03 
 
0.98  0.04 
Life cycle - pension  
   
0.93  0.03  1.08  0.02 
 
1.17  0.02 
Bequest - pension  
   
0.59  0.02  0.61  0.02 
 
0.64  0.02 
Precautionary - pension        1.21  0.02  0.97  0.02     1.08  0.03 
continues on next page 25 
 
continues from previous page 
Var[error] 
                  θ1  1.53  0.02  1.58  0.02  1.59  0.02    
    θ2  2.81  0.04  2.81  0.04  2.81  0.04  θ1=  2.31  0.05 
θ3  1.27  0.02  1.23  0.02  1.22  0.02  θ2=  1.34  0.02 
θ4  0.94  0.03  0.93  0.03  0.93  0.03  θ3=  1.64  0.04 
θ5  2.04  0.03  2.04  0.03  2.06  0.03    
    θ6  2.93  0.04  2.94  0.04  2.92  0.04  θ4=  2.08  0.07 
θ7  2.48  0.03  2.35  0.03  2.31  0.03  θ5=  2.31  0.03 
θ8  1.94  0.02  1.88  0.02  1.74  0.02  θ6=  1.59  0.02 
θ9  2.64  0.03  2.29  0.03  2.46  0.03    
    θ10  1.01  0.02  0.91  0.02  2.71  0.03    
    θ11  3.20  0.03  3.28  0.04  2.82  0.04  θ7=  2.61  0.04 
θ12  1.04  0.02  0.97  0.02  2.80  0.04  θ8=  2.86  0.04 
Cov error x10-x12              1.83  0.03          
R2 













x1=  0.44 






x2=  0.31 






x3=  0.46 













x4=  0.54 






x5=  0.24 






x6=  0.23 




















x7=  0.27 
  x12  0.72     0.73     0.23     x8=  0.21    
Correlation equivalents of covariances 
Precautionary-bequest   0.31  0.01  0.31  0.01  0.31  0.01 
 
0.25  0.01 
Precautionary-life cycle   0.74  0.01  0.91  0.01  0.84  0.01 
 
0.50  0.02 
Precautionary - pension 
   
0.70  0.01  1.00  0.01 
 
0.81  0.02 
Bequest-life cycle   0.28  0.01  0.44  0.01  0.46  0.01 
 
0.55  0.01 
Bequest - pension  
   
0.25  0.01  0.46  0.01 
 
0.55  0.01 
Life cycle - pension         0.69  0.01  1.39  0.02     1.38  0.02 
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  From these checks, we conclude that neither the structure that we imposed in 
one nor the assumptions about the underlying correlations between the different motives 
seem to be particularly restrictive, and that the factors that we predict can be used in 
our analysis of active savings. In order to visualize the results we use the estimates of 
the model with four factors to compute the factors. To get an idea of the difference in 
levels between factors we also de-standardize the predicted factors (which now  have 
means of zero) by subtracting the original mean and dividing by the standard deviation. 
As an illustration, we report results for the precautionary saving factor and the pension 
factor in Figure 5. 
  In the upper panel of the figure, we report the standardized predictions of the 
pension and saving factors. The advantage of looking at standardized predictions is that 
it is easier to compare patterns by age and time among saving factors because the level 
is the same. The upper panel of Figure 5 shows that there is an interesting time effect 
between  ages  55  and  60.  This  is  represented  by  the  vertical  distance  between  the 
segments corresponding to the average cohort year of births, 1949 and 1939. 
It seems that both the pension and the precautionary factor are higher for the 
youngest cohort age. This evident time effect is probably related to the restrictions that 
have  been  applied  to  the  1949  cohort  in  terms  of  early  retirement  since  2004.  This 
cohort (dotted line in Figure 5) has a higher level of saving factor. 
  In the lower panel of Figure 5, we de-standardize the predictions of the CFA. 
Owing to the high mean and low standard deviation of the motives that underline the 
precautionary factor, the level of the two factors differs. This shows that on average the 
precautionary  factor  has  a  higher  value  than  does  the  pension  factor.  Descriptive 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics           
 
Sample saving rate analysis  Sample housing wealth analysis 
 
mean  sd  min  max  mean  sd  min  max 
Age head  51.07  13.65  21  87  51.27  12.73  23  86 
Age head square  2794  1443  441  7569  2790  1353  529  7396 
Age head cube  162223  122084  9261  658503  160114  114508  12167  636056 
Education 2  0.51  0.50  0  1  0.50  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Education 3  0.29  0.46  0  1  0.33  0.47  0.00  1.00 
Education 4  0.15  0.35  0  1  0.14  0.34  0.00  1.00 
Bequest Factor  4.15  2.17  1.45  10.12  4.29  2.16  1.45  10.12 
Pension Factor  5.21  1.98  1.24  8.68  5.17  1.96  1.24  8.68 
Life-cycle Factor  4.82  1.60  1.47  10.32  4.77  1.60  1.47  10.32 
Precautionary Factor  8.15  2.15  1.71  11.94  8.10  2.18  1.71  11.94 
Saving rate  0.15  0.18  -0.90  0.90 
        Net housing wealth/ 
perm. income 
       
6.4  5.97  -4.21  63.99 
Self employed  0.32  0.47  0  1  0.24  0.42  0  1 
Male  1.17  0.38  1  2  1.13  0.34  1  2 
Gross income  31545  30941  0  580353  35312  31092  0  580353 
Permanent income  23833  12541  1010  232635  25608  11575  5058  232635 
Cohort  5.84  2.82  0  13  5.99  2.63  0  13 
N  11372            7310          
                   
4 Multivariate analysis 
 
4.1 Factors and savings 
In the structural model, we introduced saving factors as personality traits. These can be 
considered exogenous determinants of saving choices. However, the fact that these may 
be exogenous does not mean that the factors are unrelated to each other.  
  A  quick  look  at  the  correlations  reveals  that  the  precautionary  and  pension 
factors  have  a  correlation  of  about  0.5  (the  highest).  This  is  plausible  because 
uncertainty  about  future  income  may,  at  the  same  time,  generate  precautionary  or 
pension savings. When risk elements are introduced into the Dutch pension system, it 
will be even more difficult to separate pension and precautionary savings. 
When we estimate the association of saving factors to savings, we must take this 
into account. Typically, those who have a tendency to save, save more for all motives. 29 
 
But the attitude to saving is an unobservable characteristic. If this characteristic is time 
invariant, that is to say it is an individual fixed characteristic, we can isolate it by 
estimating a fixed effect model (Table 8). Models 1 and 4 list the results for a fixed 
effect model where, respectively, active savings (divided by permanent income) and net 
housing wealth (also divided by permanent income) are the dependent variables. We 
divide  by  permanent  income  (for  a  definition,  see  Kapteyn  et  al.  2005)  in  order  to 
account for the larger buffers of the wealthier in saving decisions. In Models 2 and 5, we 
estimate the fixed effect model using three stages of OLS regressions in order to account 
for any residual common determinant in the saving factors that is accounted for by 
observables. As a benchmark, we also estimate two OLS regressions in Models 3 and 6. 
Let  us  look  at  Model  1  first.  It  shows  that  when  the  factors  are  statistically 
significant, they are also positive. This embodies the intuition that when a saving factor 
is  active,  it  is  associated  with  higher  savings.  As,  however,  the  factors  are  de-
standardized indices it is difficult to interpret the magnitude of these effects. In order to 
do that, we simulate a factor increase by one standard deviation. 
We computed that an increase in the pension factor by one standard deviation 
increases  savings  from  about  15.3%  of  permanent  income  to  16.1%.  One  additional 
standard deviation in the precautionary factor increases savings to 15.9%, somewhat less 
than the pension factor. As the average permanent income is about 24000 euro per year, 
an increase by 0.8% translates into additional savings of 200 euro. Similar computations 
using  Model  4  indicate  that  one  additional  standard deviation  in  the  pension  factor 
increases housing wealth by about 14% of permanent income, that is to say about 3500 
euro  worth  of  additional  pension  savings  in  the  form  of  net  housing  wealth  (whose 
median value is about 122000 euro). 
A simpler way to look at the results of, for instance, Model 1 is to compute mean effects 
based on the estimated coefficients. The constant term (0.097) indicates that 10% of 
permanent income is being saved for no specific factor. As the mean savings rate is 
about 15%, the saving factors only explain the remaining 5% points of the savings rate, 
which is one-third of the total. Only 2% points are pension savings,
4 while 2.5% points 
are for precautionary reasons. 
                                                           
4 This is the product of the estimated coefficient and the mean of the pension factor (0.0039238*5.2). 30 
 
Table 8: Estimation results 
 
Dep. variable: active 
savings/permanent income 
Dep. variable: housing 
wealth/permanent income 
   
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
   
FE  3SLS (bs)  OLS 
 
FE  3SLS (bs)  OLS 
Precautionary factor  
 
0.00310***  0.00320***  0.00375*** 
 
0.168***  0.193***  0.159*** 
Bequest Factor 
 
-0.000783  -0.000896  -0.00591*** 
 
0.0576*  0.0465**  0.327*** 
Life-cycle factor 
 
0.00148  0.00147  0.0102*** 
 
0.0537  0.0656**  0.149 
Pension factor 
 
0.00392***  0.00355**  0.00606*** 
 
0.00874  0.00363  0.0205 
Constant 
 
0.0972***  0.000383***  0.0588*** 
 
4.501***  0.00192  2.905*** 
Observations 
 
11372  11372  11372 
 
7310  7310  7310 
R-squared 
 
0.004  0.004  0.026 
 
0.014  0.012  0.027 
Precautionary factor 
            Age head 
   
0.0573* 
     
0.130*** 
  Age head ^2 
   
-0.000874 
     
-0.00232** 
  Age head ^3 
   
6.95e-06* 
     
1.64e-05*** 
  Cohort 
   
-0.111*** 
     
-0.124*** 
  Permanent income 
   
-1.50e-06 
     
-2.93e-06* 
  Transitory income 
   
1.82e-06*** 
     
1.81e-06*** 
  Education 2 
   
-0.0937* 
     
-0.150* 
  Education 3 
   
-0.0864 
     
-0.139 
  Education 4 
   
-0.0749 
     
-0.142 
  Male 
   
-0.00460 
     
0.00590 
  Self-employed 
   
-0.00254 
     
-0.00478 
  Bequest Factor 
                Age head 
   
0.0340 
     
0.0486 
  Age head ^2 
   
-0.000860 
     
-0.00122 
  Age head ^3 
   
6.60e-06** 
     
9.24e-06* 
  Cohort 
   
-0.00682 
     
-0.00167 
  Permanent income 
   
6.51e-07 
     
-1.32e-07 
  Transitory income 
   
-4.08e-07 
     
-2.84e-07 
  Education 2 
   
-0.186*** 
     
-0.176** 
  Education 3 
   
-0.179*** 
     
-0.164** 
  Education 4 
   
-0.190*** 
     
-0.225*** 
  Male 
   
-0.0136 
     
0.0357 
  Self-employed 
   
0.00598 
     
-0.0174 
  Life-cycle factor 
                Age head 
   
-8.07e-05 
     
0.0779** 
  Age head ^2 
   
0.000142 
     
-0.00143** 
  Age head ^3 
   
-8.04e-07 
     
9.52e-06** 
  Cohort 
   
-0.0388*** 
     
-0.0452*** 
  Permanent income 
   
1.18e-06 
     
-2.94e-07 
  Transitory income 
   
-5.38e-07 
     
-2.30e-07 
  Education 2 
   
-0.118*** 
     
-0.224*** 
  Education 3 
   
-0.124*** 
     
-0.224*** 
  Education 4 
   
-0.130*** 
     
-0.239*** 
  Male 
   
-0.00571 
     
0.0232 
  Self-employed 
   
-0.00297 
     
-0.00925 
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Pension factor 
                Age head 
   
0.0128 
     
0.0489 
  Age head ^2 
   
-0.000146 
     
-0.000855 
  Age head ^3 
   
8.84e-07 
     
5.67e-06 
  Cohort 
   
-0.0212** 
     
-0.0281** 
  Permanent income 
   
-4.06e-07 
     
-1.24e-06 
  Transitory income 
   
7.53e-07* 
     
8.81e-07 
  Education 2 
   
-0.101** 
     
-0.119 
  Education 3 
   
-0.102** 
     
-0.0869 
  Education 4 
   
-0.103* 
     
-0.0981 
  Male 
   
-0.00864 
     
-0.0101 
  Self-employed 
   
0.0227 
     
0.0409 
    
 
Figure 5 shows that assuming no time variation in the propensity to save for retirement 
may be restrictive. The graph shows an evident time effect for the cohorts 1949 and 
1939, the former being included in a pension reform that requires extra savings in order 
to preserve early retirement entitlements. It could well be that the unobservable taste 
for saving changes over time, for instance because of the aging of the respondent or 
inclusion in a specific cohort. This calls for explicitly modeling the relation between 
those observables (such as cohort identifiers), the saving factors and savings rates (or 
housing wealth) jointly. 
We estimate the following model: 
 



















        (4)
 
where  ' ,    0 EE   for  all  disturbances,  W  is  in  turn  active  savings  or  net 
housing wealth, both divided by permanent income, and the household and time indices 
are  suppressed.  The  estimation  is  carried  out by  a  three-stage  OLS  regression.  This 
means  that  all  factors  (dependent  variables  in  this  case)  are  explicitly  taken  to  be 
endogenous to the system and are treated as correlated with the disturbances in the 32 
 
system’s  equations.  The  Xs  are  exogenous  to  the  system  and  uncorrelated  to  the 
disturbances. These can be considered as instruments for the endogenous factors. 
  The estimations in Model 2 have bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications). 
This means that both the CFA and the model in expression 4 are being bootstrapped 
jointly.  The  main  equation  is  again  a  fixed  effect  model,  in  the  sense  that  we 
transformed the variables to represent deviations from the household means. Therefore, 
the constant term is not directly comparable. 
  Relative  to  the  fixed  effect  model,  the  coefficients  in  Model  3  deliver  similar 
results, with a slightly smaller average effect of pension savings, namely 1.8% (that is 
0.00355*5.2). This means about 450 euro of the 3500 saved on average in the past year. 







i t i t
i
ANN S
i                                   (5) 
where i=5%, PI is permanent income and S is the amount of pension savings in active 
savings: 
,, 1.8%* i t i t S PI
 
Notice  that  we  do  not  include  the  stock  of  non-pension  savings  that  are  already 
accumulated in the accounts of each individual, but only the perspective annuity if S 
was invested in an annuity. The reason for not including the rest of financial wealth is 
that the pension saving factor was not significant in that analysis, likewise for housing 
wealth (this means that when this residual financial wealth is a dependent variable, the 
results were not statistically significant). In addition, these residual savings are limited 
(on  average  about  8000  euro),  and  if  the  share  of  pension  savings  hidden  in  these 
accounts was proportional to that of the savings rates, then these would add up about 
12%
5, that is to say only about 1000 euro to the final value at age 65 of ANN2. 
Our computations are contained in Table  9 where we compare the variables ANN and 
ANN2 by year of birth. Table   9  shows that putting aside about 2% of permanent 
                                                           
5 This is the relative weight of pension savings into the average saving rates: 1.8%/15%. 33 
 
income until age 65 will return a final annuity value below 5000 euro. This will not 
result in an additional annuity of substantial value. 
   
Table 9: Annuity value in euro 
 
median  median  monthly  monthly  N 





  birth  ANN  ANN2  starting 65  starting 65 
  >=1977  5309  5079  27  26  644 
1972-1976  19928  5839  107  30  1880 
1967-1971  16269  5540  87  29  2141 
1962-1966  16797  5595  90  30  3034 
1957-1961  17250  4899  93  -  3159 
1952-1956  21206  4620  114  -  3517 
1947-1951  21295  3430  114  -  3264 
1942-1946  19969  2352  107  -  2744 
1937-1941  27905  1817  156  -  1429 
1932-1936  18328  972  99  -  897 
1927-1931  13549  415  73  -  137 
 
  Notice that if we ignore the observed and unobserved common determinants of 
the saving factors by estimating a pooled OLS such as in Model 3 of Table 8, we would 
conclude that pension savings make up a larger fraction of the savings rate (0.00606*5.2 
=  3.1%  points)  relative  to  Model  2.  In  the  OLS  model,  the  share  of  precautionary 
savings is also somewhat larger (0.00375*8.15=3%  points) relative to Model 2. This 
because in the OLS model only 5.8% points of the saving depend on no specific factor. 
  Similar  conclusions  are  also  derived  when  we  look  at  the  model  for  housing 
wealth. However, here the pension factor is not statistically significant while the bequest 
factor is. A large fraction of net housing wealth rates (that are on average 6.4 times 
permanent income) is not explained by the models. If we look at Model 5, we conclude 
that the precautionary factor explains about 1.4 permanent incomes (thus about 35000 






Third pillar free pension savings are of limited importance to the median Dutch person. 
When we zoom into sub-groups, we observe that the rich are more often owners of such 
savings and save more, while being self-employed does not explain the ownership. This 
is interesting as this group has in general no occupational pension.  
  The  descriptive  evidence  on  the  whole  sample  shows  that  the  returns  of  the 
annuity, that could be bought by median free pension wealth, will increase the pension 
benefit by about 10% of the current social security benefit (which is about half of the 
median  retirement  income).  Our  sample  reports  that  people  save  for  retirement  in 
unconventional ways, for instance by leaving money in a savings account or investing in 
real estate (typically the primary residence). We construct saving factors based on a set 
of  observed  precautionary,  bequest,  life-cycle  and  pension  motives  in  a  structural 
framework. 
  We  conclude  that  these  factors  motivate  little  additional  savings  in  those 
unconventional accounts. We observe a savings rate of about 15% of permanent income. 
About two-thirds of this rate cannot be attributed to any saving motive, while about 
2% points can be attributed to pension savings. This finding is robust to several checks. 
Most importantly, we account for individual fixed effects as those who have a taste for 
saving might save more for every purpose, making the saving motives endogenous to the 
savings rate. In order to account for time varying characteristics that could affect this 
endogeneity, we also estimate a three-stage OLS regression where the saving factors are 
treated as endogenous. We find that accounting for this additional form of endogeneity 
does not affect our results. 
The large amount of purposeless savings could, of course, be employed in the future 
to support pension income by those who own savings upon retirement (all our analysis 
is conditional on ownership). However, it would be more profitable for individuals to 
invest their savings into pension annuities if this money is reserved to support pension 
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Appendix 1 : Correlation of motives 
Table a1: Correlation matrix for saving motives 
   x1  x2  x3  x4  x5  x6  x7  x8  x9  x10  x11  x12 
x1  1  0.30  0.43  0.19  0.19  0.17  0.27  0.14  0.27  0.41  0.21  0.41 
x2  0.30  1  0.37  0.13  0.21  0.13  0.18  0.14  0.31  0.40  0.21  0.33 
x3  0.43  0.37  1  0.06  0.12  0.09  0.18  0.09  0.43  0.31  0.17  0.30 
x4  0.19  0.13  0.06  1  0.56  0.50  0.24  0.16  0.04  0.15  0.18  0.15 
x5  0.19  0.21  0.12  0.56  1  0.37  0.14  0.13  0.15  0.15  0.12  0.15 
x6  0.17  0.13  0.09  0.50  0.37  1  0.15  0.22  0.03  0.18  0.23  0.19 
x7  0.27  0.18  0.18  0.24  0.14  0.15  1  0.24  0.18  0.32  0.32  0.35 
x8  0.14  0.14  0.09  0.16  0.13  0.22  0.24  1  0.10  0.16  0.45  0.17 
x9  0.27  0.31  0.43  0.04  0.15  0.03  0.18  0.10  1  0.19  0.23  0.18 
x10  0.41  0.40  0.31  0.15  0.15  0.18  0.32  0.16  0.19  1  0.21  0.74 
x11  0.21  0.21  0.17  0.18  0.12  0.23  0.32  0.45  0.23  0.21  1  0.24 
x12  0.41  0.33  0.30  0.15  0.15  0.19  0.35  0.17  0.18  0.74  0.24  1 
Explanatory note: x1 = importance of savings to cover unforeseen expenses due to illness or accidents, x2 
= importance of savings in case I or a member of my family get(s) unemployed, x3 = importance of 
savings as a reserve to cover unforeseen expenses, x4 = importance of savings to leave money to my 
children  (or  other  relatives),  x5  =  importance  of  savings  to  give  presents  or  other  gifts  to  my 
(grand)children, x6 = importance of savings to pay for my children’s (or other relatives’) education, x7 = 
importance of savings to buy durable goods such as furniture, electric appliances, in the future, x8 = 37 
 
importance of savings to generate income from interests or dividends, x9 = importance of savings to set 
up my own business, x10 = importance of savings to supplement retirement pension, some extra money 
for when I am retired, x11 = importance of savings to buy a house in the future, x12 = importance of 
savings to supplement the social security benefit. 
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